The Time of Assent: Constitutional Boundaries and the Governor’s Accountability
The recent case before the Supreme Court in the State of Tamil Nadu vs the governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. has taken center stage as an emblem of constitutional defiance and a reassertion of Federal norms. The issue at hand arose when Governor R.N. Ravi delayed granting assent to ten legislative bills while reserving two for assent by the President thereby bringing the constitutional machinery to a standstill and raising serious questions about the misuse of gubernatorial excess powers. It is to be noted that the constitutional mandate for the governor to reserve a bill for assent by the president is prescribed in the substantive part of art 200 of the constitution, where it is stated “the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger
The position that the Court is by this Constitution designed to fill “, rest everything is pure discretion.
At its core, the case confronts the effective role of the Governor, whose authority under Article 200 of the Constitution is meant to be exercised within clearly defined bounds. The State of Tamil Nadu, argued that once a bill is re-passed by the legislature, the Governor is constitutionally bound to grant assent. The Bench, a division bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, upholding this view, delivered a groundbreaking judgment that struck down the indefinite delays by imposing strict timelines for the governor to act on a bill once presented to him, bringing clarity to the vague phrasing of “as soon as possible” in Article 200.
The judgment itself is historic. The Court held that once a bill is re-enacted by the Assembly, the Governor cannot withhold assent or reserve it for the President’s consideration. The power to withhold is meant to be used only once, and if the legislature stands by its bill, the Governor must comply. Further, invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to do “complete justice,” the Court declared that the ten re-passed Bills are deemed to have received assent on the very day they were re-submitted. Of equal significance was the Court’s imposition of firm deadlines: if the Governor acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers, he must sign the bill into action within one month; if acting contrary to ministerial advice, within three months; and if a re-passed bill is presented, assent must be granted within one month. These deadlines are crucial to prevent executive inaction from delaying the democratic process of lawmaking.
This landmark decision has its roots in a well-established tenet of constitutional law. In the seminal 1974 ruling of Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab, the Supreme Court had firmly established that the Governor is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, with the option of exercising his discretionary powers only in “exceptional circumstances”. More recently, in the 2023 decision of State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab, the Court reinforced that an unelected Governor cannot delay the normal course of state lawmaking by “pocket vetoing” the legislation. These precedents serve as a doctrinal foundation for the current judgment, which decisively reasserts the primacy of the elected legislature over the center-appointed office of the governor.
Section 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935 talks about the concept of assent to bills. Article 200 of our constitution is largely modelled after section 75. However, the areas in which it differs are of immense relevance to the case at hand. Historical records of the debates of the constituent assembly show that when Article 175 of the draft constitution was taken up for consideration, certain amendments were proposed by Dr. Ambedkar that set apart the colonial era law from the constitutional mandate we have today. These amendments included removing the words “in his discretion” from the first provision of Article 175 because it was felt that in a responsible government, there can be no room for discretion by the governor. Under Section 75, there was no mandate upon the Governor to
mandatorily assent to a bill when the bill was presented to him for reconsideration. However, in Article 147 of the draft prepared by Sir BN Rau, the expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” was added in the first proviso, which was later adopted in Article 200 of the constitution. The current judgment strengthens the idea of federalism that the drafters oof ur constitution envisioned.
The judgment should be looked at in the context of the broader struggle over appointments and administrative autonomy, particularly concerning state universities and public bodies. Bills targeting the reallocation of powers for appointing Vice Chancellors and restructuring university administrative bodies had been stalled for over three years, hinting at a systemic inclination by the Raj Bhawan to resist changing the existing power dynamics of a state considering prior to the bill, the power to appoint the Vice Chancellors resided with the Governor. Such inaction could derail the democratic process, where elected representatives are sidelined by an unelected official wielding vague constitutional provisions. It is in this light that the Court’s intervention is not only welcome but imperative.
This judgment also proves to be a commendable effort to incorporate the recommendations put forth by several significant commissions in the past. The Sarkaria Commission, established in the 1980s, long emphasized that the Governor’s discretionary powers should only be exercised in genuinely exceptional circumstances. It advocated for a framework that did not sacrifice on legislative autonomy, all the while balancing the fine balance of power between the center and the state. This was later reaffirmed by subsequent recommendations of the Punchhi Commission which underscored the need for a clear separation of powers and robust center-state relations, particularly regarding appointments and administrative oversight. Had these recommendations been fully implemented, the current impasse over gubernatorial authority might have been preempted by a more transparent and accountable system—one that does not permit indefinite delays or arbitrary decisions.
As the judiciary makes strides in ensuring the federal structure of the country remains robust, one must ask why such attempts by members of the parliament do not receive the same attention? It is imperative to consider why there has been close to zero discussion on the private members bill introduced by Rajya Sabha member P. Wilson back in 2022. The constitution amendment bill (2022) sought to redress ambiguities surrounding appointments and the expansive powers of the Governor, promising to strengthen checks on executive overreach. The bill touches upon key provisions mentioned in the current judgment such as setting a time limit of a month for a governor to act on a bill sent to him by the state legislature. The constitutional amendment bill also prescribes the alteration of articles 156 and 157 of the constitution to amend the eligibility of a person to be appointed a governor, further strengthening the federal structure of the country. And yet, its potential to bring balance to the complex structure of constitutional powers has mostly gone unnoticed. Is this silence merely a symptom of political inertia, or does it indicate a deeper, perhaps deliberate, reluctance to disturb entrenched power dynamics? The absence of a robust debate on such a critical reform leaves us questioning whether vested interests are more comfortable with the status quo than with transparency and accountability.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s judgment stands as a commendable and transformative step toward restoring constitutional propriety. It not only reaffirms the primacy of the legislative mandate over executive discretion but also heralds a move toward disciplined and accountable governance. With its clear articulation of the Governor’s limited role and the imposition of time-bound obligations, the ruling acts as a safeguard against executive inaction while strengthening the institutional machinery of Indian federalism. While this decision is undoubtedly a significant milestone in reinforcing democratic norms and curbing arbitrary delays, it also reminds us that the journey toward comprehensive constitutional reform is still long. The judgment lights the way forward—a commendable and necessary stride in the right direction, yet one that marks only the beginning of a broader reimagining of executive authority within India’s vibrant federal structure.
-Sidharat Som Mohanty & Kriti Taneja
-15/04/2025
